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THE HELMS-BURTON ACT: A STEP IN THE
WRONG DIRECTION FOR UNITED STATES
POLICY TOWARD CUBA
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 12, 1996, in response to Cuba's downing of two
American civilian aircraft,' President Clinton signed the Helms-
Burton Act into law.2 The Act represents the United States's most
recent political strike against Cuba in the United States's and Cuba's
ongoing war of ideologies and finances. Far more than any other
economic weapons that the United States has used in its campaign to
subvert the Castro regime, the Act has caused the United States to
become the target of significant international criticism.3 Such
criticism stems from the provisions of the Act that allow American
citizens to recover damages in United States courts from foreign
entities that own or benefit from American-owned property in Cuba
that has been expropriated by the Cuban government. So far,
1. On February 24, 1996, Cuban fighter jets shot down two Cessna aircraft carrying anti-
Castro Cuban-Americans. See Tim Weiner, Clinton Considers Punishing Cubans for Plane
Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1996, at Al. The anti-Castro group, Brothers to the Rescue,
piloted the two Cessna aircraft. See Barbara Crosette, U.S. Says Cubans Knew They Fired on
Civilian Planes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1996, at At. President Clinton condemned the downing
of the planes. See Remarks on the Downing of Brothers to the Rescue Airplanes by Cuba Aid
an Exchange with Reporters in Shoreline, Washington, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 374
(Feb. 24, 1996).
2. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat.
785.
3. Most of the United States's trading partners have condemned the United States for
enacting a law that they consider to be contrary to international law. See UNITED STATES
ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST CUBA: PROCEEDINGS IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUES 15 (Michael Krusky & David Golove eds., 1993).
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however, the Act has had a greater detrimental effect on the United
States's relations with its allies than it has had on the Cuban
government.
This Note will show that neither the embargo nor the Helms-
Burton Act have been effective in bringing about change within Cuba
or in gathering support from the international community for the
United States's hard-line position toward Cuba. Part II of this Note
describes how the deterioration in the United States's relations with
Cuba led to its present embargo against Cuba and discusses
legislation passed after the initial imposition of the embargo. Part III
examines recent events that led to the proposal of the Helms-Burton
Act, as well as the provisions and ramifications of the Act. Part IV
discusses the legality of the embargo and the new sanctions created
by the Act, and analyzes a proposed alternative to the current regime.
Finally, Part V proposes that the United States should remove the
embargo against Cuba and substitute a new regime of law that would
not only be more effective for furthering reform in Cuba, but would
also benefit United States economic interests.
I. THE UNITED STATES'S EMBARGO AGAINST CUBA
A. Roots of the Embargo
Fidel Castro assumed power in Cuba on January 1, 1959,
deposing President Fulgencio Batista.4 American relations with Cuba
began to deteriorate when Castro aligned himself with the former
Soviet Union and sold sugar in exchange for oil.5 The United States
eventually eliminated Cuba's sugar quota.6 In retaliation, Castro
nationalized foreign owned businesses and property without
providing compensation.7 Fearing that Castro would spread his
4. See ROBERT E. QUIRK, FIDEL CASTRO: THE FULL STORY OF HIS RISE TO POWER, HIS
REGIME, HIS ALLIES, AND HIS ADVERSARIES 177-243 (1993).
5. See WALTER LAFEBER, THE AMERICAN AGE: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AT HOME AND
ABROAD, 1750 TO THEPRESENT 567 (1994).
6. 'See Shari Ellen Bourque, The Illegality of the Cuban Embargo in the Current
International System, 13 B.U. IN'TLL.J. 191, 196 (1995).
7. See Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Alternative Remedies in a Negotiated Settlement of the
U.S. Nationals' Expropriations Claims Against Cuba, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 659, 661
(1996). The legal basis for the government's expropriation of the privately owned properties
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agenda to Latin America, the United States engaged in an attempted
invasion of Cuba on April 17, 1961.8 The invasion, which occurred at
the Bay of Pigs, backfired when the 1400 Cuban exiles organized by
the Central Intelligence Agency were intercepted by Castro's forces
as they landed.9 This defeat seriously weakened the anti-Castro
movement, and the United States, in order to constrict Castro's
was the Fundamental Law of the Republic, adopted in 1953. See Ley Fundamenta de la
Republica, No. 5-123, Gaceta Oficial, 7 Feb., 1959 (Cuba); see also, MICHAEL W. GORDON,
THE CUBAN NATIONALIZATIONS 71 (1976) (citing Ley Fundamenta de la Republica, No. 5-123,
Gasceta Oficial, 7 Feb., 1959 (Cuba)).
Cuban officials were authorized to nationalize property whenever they deemed it
"convenient in defense of the national interest." John W. Smagula, Redirecting Focus:
Justifying the U.S. Embargo Against Cuba and Resolving the Stalemate, 21 N.C. J. INT'L &
COM. REG. 65, 73 (1995). The law was passed under the auspices of Article 24 of the Cuban
Constitution, which the Cuban Council of Ministers had illegally amended without following
the required constitutional procedures. See Supporting Democracy in Cuba: Hearings on S. 381
and H.R. 927 Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995)
(statement of Ignacio E. Sanchez, Attorney, Kelley Drye & Warren), available in WESTLAW,
1995 WL 357720 [hereinafter Sanchez]. Article 24, as originally enacted, prohibited
confiscation of property "except by competent judicial authority and for a justified cause of
public utility or social interest, and always after payment of the corresponding indemnity in
cash." Id.
Sanchez detailed three significant changes in Amendment 24 that facilitated the seizure of
American owned property. The first change amended Article 24 to permit the confiscation of
property from persons "leaving the national territory," thereby targeting Cuban exiles already in
the United States. See id. The second amendment allowed for confiscations to be authorized by
nonjudicial authorities, allowed the government to decide the form of compensation, and
deleted the provision of Article 24 that allowed the party whose property was expropriated to
appeal to the courts. See id. The third amendment extended the governmental confiscation
authority to include "those [cases] deemed necessary by the Government in order to prevent
acts of sabotage, terrorism or any other counter-revolutionary activities." Id.
The government then distributed confiscated land to Cuban citizens or transformed it into
agricultural cooperatives. See Smagula, supra, at 69. The law established procedural safeguards
for property owners and provided that owners of seized property would be compensated with
twenty-year bonds bearing an annual interest rate of 4.5%. See id. at 70. The Castro regime,
however, did not comply with the procedural aspects of the law and instead confiscated
property in a "random and offensive manner." Id. at 72.
Moreover, Cuba did not recompense the property owners and, thus, violated principles of
international law. See Brice M. Clagett, Title III of the Helms-Burton Act is Consistent with
International Law, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 434, 434 (1996) (noting that the Cuban government did
not compensate property owners for the massive confiscations of property); see also
OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 920-21 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9th
ed. 1992) (noting that international law requires compensation for government confiscated
property). In total, Castro confiscated $1.8 billion of American-owned property. See John
Kirschten, Raising Cain, THE NATIONAL JOURNAL, July 1, 1995.
8. See Quirk, supra note 4, at 359-76.
9. See id.
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power, imposed an economic embargo banning all trade with and
travel to Cuba. 0
President John F. Kennedy formalized the ban on trade and travel
by issuing the Cuban Import Regulations. The President acted
pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which authorized
him to impose an economic embargo against Cuba." President
Kennedy implemented the embargo in Presidential Proclamation
344712 on February 4, 1962. Section 620(a) of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 196113 and Presidential Proclamation 3447,14 along with other
laws and regulations that were implemented before the Helms-Burton
Act, comprise a legal structure designed to reach all possible
activities and transactions that affect the Cuban economy.'
5
B. Legal Framework of the Embargo
An understanding of the implications of the Helms-Burton Act on
the future of United States-Cuba relations requires an analysis of the
other laws and regulations that comprise the embargo.' 6 In addition to
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 17 and Presidential Proclamation
10. See LAFEBER, supra note 5, at 568. On March 20, 1998, President Clinton eased
restrictions on direct flights to Cuba, allowing for humanitarian aid and passengers in
emergency situations to be flown to Cuba. Telephone Interview by Tanuja Garde with Steven
Erlager, Foreign News Writer, The New York Times (Mar. 20, 1998).
11. See22 U.S.C. § 2370(a) (1994).
12. 27 Fed. Reg. 1085 (1962). The Proclamation prohibits the American importation of
Cuban goods and all goods imported through Cuba and directs the Secretary of the Treasury to
implement this prohibition. See id. It also directs the Secretary of Commerce to impose the
embargo on exports to Cuba. See id. The Proclamation contains no time limits nor any
conditions for when and how the embargo may be lifted. See id. Proclamation 3447 is still in
effect, although the embargo has since been codified and expanded by other laws and
regulations. See infra Part H.B.
13. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a) (1994).
14. 27 Fed. Reg. 1085 (1962).
15. See Maria L. Pagan, U.S. Legal Requirements Affecting Trade with Cuba, 7 PACE
INT'L L. REV. 485 (1995).
16. See Pagan, supra note 15, at 485. Pagan describes these laws and regulations as a
"two-tiered legal structure designed to reach every possible activity and transaction affecting
the Cuban economy." Id. The most significant set of legal requirements are those comprising
the first tier, see id., which are described in Part H.B. The second-tier consists of other
restrictions which, although currently having little practical effect, would become more
significant if the first-tier restrictions were removed. See Pagan, supra note 15, at 509.
17. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a) (1994). "
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3447,18 the laws and regulations defining the embargo include the
Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 19 the Export Administration
Regulations (EAR),20 and the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992.21
The Cuban Assets Control Regulations, first issued in July 1963,
effectively impose the embargo on Cuba.22 The Regulations prohibit
United States Citizens and corporations from conducting business
transactions with Cuba or Cuban nationals. The prohibition extends
to transactions involving property in Cuba or belonging to a Cuban
national unless the transaction is licensed under the Regulations.23
The Regulations also prohibit United States citizens from traveling to
Cuba with the exceptions of journalists,24 government officials
traveling on official business, 25  and close relatives of Cuban
nationals. 26 In addition, section 785.1 of the EAR requires a license
for the export of United States goods to Cuba.27
The Cuban Democracy Act of 199228 (CDA) added several
18. 27 Fed. Reg. 1085 (1962).
19. Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.Rt § 515 (1996).
20. 15 C.F.R. § 785.1 (1996).
21. 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6012 (1994).
22. See John Yoo, Federal Courts as Weapons ofForeign Policy: The Case of the Helms-
Burton Act, 20 HASTING INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 747, 749 (1997). The Regulations are
administered by the Office of Foreign Assets Control under the authority granted to the
President by the Trading With the Enemy Act (TWEA), 50 U.S.C. app. § 5 (1994), and the
International Economic Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1994).
23. See Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515.201 (1993). The Regulations
provide for both general licenses and specific licenses. See Pagan, supra note 15, at 491 (citing
Remarks by Dennis M. O'Connell, reported in Are the U.S. Treasury's Assets Control
Regulations a Fair and Effective Tool of U.S. Foreign Policy? The Case of Cuba, 79 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 169, 175 (1985)). General licenses do not require approval for certain
types of transactions. See id. On the other hand, specific licenses are issued on a case-by-case
basis by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Department of the Treasury. See id.
For a list of what types of transactions are subject to either general or specific licenses, see
Pagan, supra note 15, at 491-93.
24. See Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515.560(a)(1)(ii) (1993).
25. Seeid. § 515.560(a)(1)(I) (1993).
26. See id. § 515.560(a)(1)(iii). Specific licenses may also be issued for persons traveling
for humanitarian, religious, or similar activities, or for purposes related to the exportation,
importation, or transmission of informational materials. See id. § 515.560(b).
27. See 15 C.F.R. § 785.1 (1992). Few general licenses are available for the export of
certain goods. See Pagan, supra note 15, at 506. Specific licenses are available on a case-by-
case basis for the exportation of humanitarian, medical, and non-strategic foreign-made
products. See id.
28. 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6012 (1994). The Act was proposed by Rep. Robert Torricelli (D-
N.J.) 'to promote a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba through the application of
1998]
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provisions that, by strengthening and extending the reach of the
embargo, elicited an overwhelmingly negative international
reaction.2 9 Similarly, United States businesses have reacted to the
embargo with indignation as they desire to compete with foreign
businesses in Cuba that need not comply with the CDA.3° In this
regard, a number of trade groups have been formed to lobby the
United States government to normalize relations with Cuba.3 1
appropriate pressures on the Cuban government and support for the Cuban people."' Joanna R.
Cameron, The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992: The International Implications, 20 FLETCHER F.
WORLD AFF. 137, 138 (1996) (quoting 138 Cong. Rec. H9084 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1992)
(statement ofRep. Toricelli)).
29. See Luisette Gierboloni, Comment, The Helms-Burton Act: Inconsistency with
International Law and Irrationality at Their Maximum, 6 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 289, 295
(1997). The two provisions of the CDA which most angered the international community were
the revocation of trade licenses for foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies doing business in
Cuba, see 22 U.S.C. § 6005(a)(1), and the exclusion of any ships trading with Cuba from
docking at U.S. ports for six months after leaving a Cuban port, see 22 U.S.C. § 6005(b)(1); see
also Richard D. Porotsky, Note, Economic Coercion and the General Assembly: A Post-Cold
War Assessment of the Legality and Utility of the Thirty-Five-Year Old Embargo Against Cuba,
28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 901, 913-14 (1995). Prior to 1975, foreign-owned subsidiaries of
the U.S. corporations had, in effect, a general license to participate in trade with Cuba. See
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act, 90 AM. 3. INT'L L. 419,
421 (1996). This policy was modified in 1975 to replace the general license provision with a
requirement that foreign-owned subsidiaries desiring to trade with Cuba apply for a specific
license. See 40 Fed. Reg. 47108 (1975); see also Lowenfeld, supra, at 421. The CDA extended
the embargo by banning the issuance of any license to foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms. See id.
at 422.
In addition to tightening restrictions on trade with Cuba, the CDA seeks to encourage other
nations to restrict their trade and credit relations with Cuba. See 22 U.S.C. § 6003(a) (1994).
The CDA does this by allowing for sanctions against those nations that provide assistance to
Cuba. Possible sanctions include ineligibility for U.S. assistance under the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act, and ineligibility for forgiveness or reduction of
any debt owed to the U.S. government. See id. Both the United Kingdom and Canada quickly
passed legislation prohibiting companies operating in their countries from complying with the
CDA. See Cameron, supra note 28, at 141. The European Union also reacted strongly to the
CDA restrictions. In 1995, the European Parliament suggested that members disregard the CDA
and continue conducting business with Cuba. See id.
30. See Cameron, supra note 28, at 143. Seeking ways to circumvent the embargo, more
than one hundred U.S. businesses attended a Euromoney conference on Cuban investment
opportunities in 1992. See id. Moreover, in 1994, many U.S. companies went to Cuba and
"signed letters of intent for future contracts to take effect when the U.S. embargo comes to an
end." Id.; see also Porotsky, supra note 29, at 955 (noting that former Chrysler Chairman Lee
Iacocca traveled to Cuba for potential investment options); Borque, supra note 6, at 222-23
(discussing how American individuals and corporations have set up and contributed to
investment funds with the intention of expanding into Cuba upon the cessation of the embargo).
31. See George Moffett, Clinton Shuns Potent Anti-Castro Lobby, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, June 9, 1995, at 1. Moreover, an overwhelming majority of the Fortune 500 member
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Public anti-Castro sentiment in the United States seems to be
subsiding as well. A 1992 public opinion poll showed that the
majority of those surveyed believe that the United States should re-
establish diplomatic and economic relations with Cuba, abolish the
travel ban, and remove sanctions on third parties investing in Cuba.
32
Members of Congress support this sentiment as well.33 In addition,
many formerly staunch critics of Castro now believe that normalizing
relations with Cuba is the best way to undermine him. 4
III. THE HELMS-BURTON ACT
A. Recent Events Leading Up to the Helms-Burton Act
After Castro aligned himself with the Communist Party and the
United States ceased trading with Cuba,35 the Soviet Union became
Cuba's leading trade partner and began providing Cuba with massive
economic subsidies. With the official dissolution of the Soviet
Union in September 1991, Cuba no longer received these subsidies,
companies of the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council support the normalization of
relations with Cuba, "with or without Fidel Castro." Id.
32. See Bourque, supra note 6, at 222.
33. On September 9, 1994, Senator Claibome Pell (D-ILL), the Chairman of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee, and Representative Lee Hamilton (D-Ind.), the Chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, called for a lifting of the embargo. See Porotsky, supra
note 29, at 905 n.12.
34. These critics include U.S.-Cuba Foundation founder Gary Jarmin, National Review
Editor William F. Buckley, television commentator John McLaughlin, columnist Fred Barnes,
and the Wall Street Journal editorial board. See Christopher Marquis, New Voices Say It's Time
to End Cuban Embargo, SEATTLE TIMES, June 18, 1995, at A3.
35. The end of U.S.-Cuban trade relations adversely affected the Cuban economy. Prior to
the embargo, the United States had provided Cuba with machinery and supplies for mining and
transportation, communication, and utility services. After the embargo was put in place, Cuban
businesses and industries that relied on U.S. raw materials were financially crushed. See
Bourque, supra note 50, at 198. For example, Cuba's sugar industry was severly affected by the
embargo. See Porotsky, supra note 29, at 907. In 1959, sugar constituted 77% of Cuba's export
value, with the United States purchasing 70% of that amount at a premium over world sugar
prices. See id. at 907-08.
36. See United States Policy Toward Cuba: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the W.
Hemisphere of the House Comm. on Int'l Relations, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statement of
Peter Tarnoff, Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs) [hereinafter Tamoff]. Prior to
1989, these subsidies ranged in amounts from $4 billion to $6 billion per year. See id.; see also
Porotsky, supra note 29, at 951 (discussing how the Socialist bloc subsidized the Cuban
economy by paying nearly triple the market price for Cuban sugar).
1998]
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causing its economic output to drop by an estimated fifty percent.3
7
Castro, faced with the challenge of reviving a struggling Cuban
economy, embarked on a program of economic liberalization,
instituting previously unheard of measures such as inviting foreign
companies to invest in joint ventures with the Cuban government,38
allowing for private enterprise in the form of self-employment3 9 and
private farming,40 and legalizing the use of United States Dollars by
37. See Tarnoff, supra note 36.
38. Despite the serious need for foreign investment, Cuban joint ventures are still subject
to strict regulations. See Their Men in Havana, ECONOMIST, Apr. 6, 1996, at 12. Until 1995,
foreign companies were permitted no more than a 49% ownership interest in any joint venture.
See id. A foreign-investment law passed in September 1995 made it possible for foreign
companies to own a 100% interest in a joint venture in limited circumstances. See Id. In
addition, foreign companies must distribute their products through state dealerships and must
pay the salaries of their Cuban employees in U.S. Dollars to the Cuban government. See id. The
Cuban government then pays the employees in Pesos. See id. By 1996, more than 650 foreign
companies had invested in Cuban joint ventures, committing to invest a total of $2.1 billion. See
id. Mexico was the top investor, committing $250 million in investments. See Tracey Eaton,
Cuba Opens Door to Free-Enterprise Zones, DALLAS NEWS, May 13, 1997, at DI.
Setting up a joint venture requires that a foreign investor submit its venture proposal to a
commission appointed by the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers. See Bourque,
supra note 6, at 200. This commission authorizes and oversees all joint ventures. See id. After
the proposal is approved, the parties draft a "memorandum of association" and "statutes" which
define the scope of the venture as well as the management procedures. See id. at 201. Certain
provisions of the memorandum must require that the venture be "temporary in duration." Id.
The Cuban government, however, has shown a willingness to grant long-term leases of up to
ninety-nine years for property used in joint ventures, establishing "quasi-private" property
rights. See id. at 201.
39. See The Hazards of Enterprise, ECONOMIST, Apr. 6, 1996, at 7. In order to prevent a
re-emergence of a bourgeoisie class of shopkeepers and businessmen, the Castro regime has
placed tight restrictions on self-employed individuals. See id. Sellers of goods are not allowed
to have private retail stores; rather, they must move from place to place peddling their goods.
See id. Private restaurants are limited to seating twelve people and are not permitted to
advertise. See id. The number of self-employed individuals was approximately 208,000 at the
end of 1995, but was reported to have dropped to just over 167,000 a year later due to a
government taxation offensive against self-employed workers. See A Long, Slow Haul for
Cuba's Economy, FIN'L TIMES, Jan. 27, 1997, at 3; see also Enrique Rangel, The Tarman
Cometh, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 29, 1997, at DI (describing the burden that the taxes
place on entrepreneurs).
40. See Oranges and Lemons: The Limits of Farm Reform, ECONOMIST, Apr. 6, 1996, at
8. The percentage of Cuba's cultivable land controlled by large state-subsidized farms
decreased from 75% to 27% between 1992 and 1995. See id. These private farmers, however,
are also subject to strict requirements: They must lease their land and buy their equipment from
the state and sell a fixed quota of production to the state. See id. However, they are allowed to
sell anything above their quota in the open market. See id. The privatization of agriculture has
increased output for most crops, with the primary exception being sugar, Cuba's most vital
crop. See id. Sugar production fell from 8.1 million tons in 1990 to 3.3 million tons in 1995. See
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Cuban citizens. Seeing a great business opportunity, many foreign
firms began to invest in Cuba with Castro's blessing. These included
firms from most of the United States's major trading partners,
including Canada and the countries of the European Union.4'
Additionally, the Cuban government implemented significant
constitutional changes in order to assure foreign companies that it
was serious about engaging in joint ventures.42
These reforms encouraged opposition groups within Cuba to
accelerate their activities. In October 1995, dissident groups within
Cuba formed the Concilio Cubano, an association geared toward
urging the Castro government to grant Cuban citizens the rights
guaranteed to them by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the Cuban Constitution.43 Some opposition to the Castro regime
has also come from the Catholic Church.44 A group of experts
commissioned by the Pentagon concluded, however, that the majority
of Cuban citizens support the Castro regime and that, thus, there was
little chance of internal rebellion.45
In the meantime, former Cuban citizens living in the United States
have been vehemently speaking out against Castro.46 Some of these
id. This decline is due in part to the unavailability of the large quantities of fertilizer and
machinery needed to maintain production levels. See id. Additionally, sugar co-ops have less of
a production incentive as they are barred from selling in the farmers' markets. See id
41. See Bourque, supra note 6, at 202.
42. See id. at 203. In July 1992, the National Assembly of People's Power amended and
added articles of the Cuban Constitution. See id. Article 14 was amended to allow for the
transfer of state-owned property to private ownership if the transfers "promote the economic
and social good of the country." Id. Article 15, which limits the public ownership of property,
was amended to apply only to "social property," therefore allowing for private ownership of
other types of property. See id. at 204. The government also added Article 23 to the
Constitution, which provides that, "Mhe state recognizes the ownership of mixed enterprises,
economic societies, and associations that are created according to law. The use, benefit, and
sale of assets belonging to these entities are ruled by law and treaties as well as by their own
statutes and regulations." Id.
43. See Ernesto F. Betancourt, Castro's Blunder, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 1996. Concilio
Cubano, however, is not a very cohesive group as the separate groups which comprise it do not
agree on many issues. See Fidel's World: Don't Underestimate It, ECONOMIST, Apr. 6, 1996, at
4.
44. See Fidel's World: Don't Underestimate It, supra note 43. One example of the limited
nature of opposition by the Catholic church was a December 1995 clash with the government
over a ban on Christmas trees in public places. See id.
45. See Moffett, supra note 3 1.
46. The Cuban-American National Foundation (CANF), led by Jorge Mas Canosa, has
been a staunch opponent of the Castro regime for the last fifteen years. See Moffett, supra note
1998]
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Cuban exiles formed a group known as Brothers to the Rescue, a
humanitarian organization devoted to helping Cuban refugees. On
February 24, 1996, Cuban fighter planes shot down two of the
group's private planes, claiming that they had violated Cuban
airspace. The attack killed all four American citizens aboard the
planes.47 This action led to international outrage and increased
support for the Helms-Burton Act from both President Clinton48 and
the conference committee considering the Act's House and Senate
bills at that time.
B. Legislative History
On February 14, 1995, Representative Dan Burton (R-Ind.)
introduced in the House of Representatives the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1995.49 The House
passed the bill on September 21 by a vote of 294-130.50 The bill,
introduced in the Senate by Senator Jesse Helms51 (R-N.C.), passed,
31. Through aggressive lobbying and large financial contributions to lawmakers, CANF has
virtually directed U.S. policy toward Cuba for the last 15 years. See id.
47. In an ironic postscript to this tragedy, Brothers to the Rescue leader Jose Basulto
stated his plans to sue the U.S. government, claiming the government failed to protect the
planes once U.S. radar detected the Cuban jets. See William E. Gibson, YearAfter Shooldown,
U.S., Cuba at Stalemate, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Feb. 23, 1997, at Al. Basulto
has placed some of the blame for the attack on the United States, saying he was "convinced that
there was a conspiracy" within the U.S. government to allow the attack to proceed. Nick
Madigan, In Airborne Salute, Fallen Cuban Exiles Are Honored, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 1997,
atA3.
48. The Clinton administration was initially opposed to the bill. In a letter to Speaker
Newt Gingrich in September 1995, Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated that he was
"deeply concerned" about the Act and that he would recommend that the President veto the bill
if it was passed by Congress. See Lowenfeld, supra note 35, at 419 n.3. After the Cuban fighter
plane attack, President Clinton announced that he would sign the bill. See id. at 419.
49. Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785.
50. The bill was passed in essentially the same form in which it was eventually signed
into law. See Lowenfeld, supra note 29, at 419 n.2. Initially, support for the Act was largely
split along party lines: Republicans supported the bill by a margin of 227-4, while Democrats
voted against the bill by a 125-67 margin. See BILL TRACKING REPORT, H.R. 927, 104th Cong.
(1996) [hereinafter TRACKING REPORT].
51. According to Gary Jarmin, head of the U.S. Cuba Foundation, Helms's motivation for
introducing the bill stemmed partly from the lobbying influence of former Cuban rum giant
Bacardi, which stands to become one of the largest beneficiaries of the Act. See Ann Davis,
Helms to Cuba: See You in Court, NAT'L L.J., July 10, 1995, at Al. For support of his
contention, Jarmin pointed to a $500-per-plate luncheon that the president and CEO of Bacardi-
Martini USA hosted for Senator Helms. See id. He also noted that a Bacardi lawyer, Ignacio E.
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as amended, on October 19, 1995.52 On December 14, 1995, the
Senate afreed to the House's request for a conference committee on
the Bill.5 After the conference committee submitted its report,54 the
bill received widespread bipartisan support in both houses. President
Clinton signed the bill into law on March 12, 1996. 55
C. Reaction to the Helms-Burton Act
From the time of its introduction, the Helms-Burton Act enjoyed
almost complete support from Republicans. The Act gained
widespread support among Democrats in the aftermath of the
downing of the American planes. It also enjoyed widespread support
among the Cuban exile community in Florida, a powerful political
lobbying force. Some members of Congress, however, did not agree
that the Act represented the most effective method of subverting the
Castro regime. Prior to the final House vote on the Act on March 6,
1996, Congressman Jack Reed stated that, while he supported the
promotion of a democratic Cuba, the Act was contrary to American
foreign policy.56 He further noted that it would increase tensions
between the United States and Cuba, thereby endangering a peaceful
transition to democracy,57 and contained a loophole which could
encourage more foreign investment in Cuba. 8
The Helms-Burton Act was not the only legislation introduced in
the House in 1995 that was designed to promote democratic change
in Cuba. Representative Charles Rangel (D-N.Y.) introduced the Free
Trade With Cuba Act on February 9, 1995.'9 The provisions of the
Free Trade With Cuba Act included the complete removal of the
Sanchez of Kelley Drye & Warren, was involved in drafting the bill. See id
52. As amended, the bill passed by a 74-24 margin. See TRACKING REPORT, supra note
50. Republican Senators supported the bill by a 51-2 margin while Democrats supported it by a
narrow 23-22 margin. See id.
53. See id.
54. H.R. REP. No. 468, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996).
55. See Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-114, 110 Stat. 785.
56. See 142 CONG. REC. E308-09 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1996) (statement of Rep. Reed).
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See H.R. 883, 104th Cong. (1995).
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embargo, 60 the removal of prohibitions against travel to Cuba by
United States citizens, 61 and the institution of negotiations with Cuba
for the purpose of settling claims of United States citizens whose
property had been expropriated by the Cuban government.
62
D. Provisions of the Helms-Burton Act
The Helms-Burton Act is divided into four Titles, preceded by
sections containing Findings, Purposes, 63 and Definitions. 64 Title I is
subtitled "Strengthening International Sanctions Against the Castro
Government., 65 Among the Provisions of Title I are: (1) "The
codification of the economic embargo against Cuba; 66  (2) "A
60. See id. § 3.
61. Seeid.§5.
62. See id. § 7.
63. The purposes of the Act are-
(1) to assist the Cuban people in regaining their freedom and prosperity, as well as
joining the community of democratic countries that are flourishing in the Western
Hemisphere;
(2) to strengthen international sanctions against the Castro government;
(3) to provide for the continued national security of the United States in the face of
continuing threats from the Castro government of terrorism, theft of property from
United States nationals by the Castro government, and the political manipulation by
the Castro government of the desire of Cubans to escape that results in mass migration
to the United States;
(4) to encourage the holding of free and fair democratic elections in Cuba, conducted
under the supervision of internationally recognized observers;
(5) to provide a policy framework for United States support to the Cuban people in
response to the formation of a transition govemment or a democratically elected
government in Cuba; and
(6) to protect United States nationals against confiscatory takings and the wrongful
trafficking in property confiscated by the Castro regime.
Id. §3.
64. See id. § 4.
65. See id. §§ 101-116.
66. See id. § 102. Section 102(a) "reaffirms section 1704(a) of the Cuban Democracy Act
of 1992, which states that the President should encourage foreign countries to restrict trade and
credit relations with Cuba" and "urges the President to take immediate steps to apply the
sanctions described in section 1704(b)(1) of that Act against countries assisting Cuba." Id.
Section 102(b) instructs the Secretary of State to "ensure that United States diplomatic
personnel abroad ... [urge] foreign governments to cooperate more effectively with the
embargo." Id. Section 102(c) instructs the President to "enforce fully the Cuban Assets Control
Regulations set forth in [31 C.F.R. § 515]." Id. Section 102(e) instructs the President to
"enforce fully existing regulations to deny visas to Cuban nationals considered by the Secretary
of State to be officers or employees of the Cuban Government or of the Communist Party of
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prohibition on indirect financing of Cuba";67 (3) "Statements of
opposition to Cuban membership in international financial
institutions 68 and to the termination of the suspension of Cuba's
participation in the Organization of American States"; 69 (4) "The
withholding of aid from any independent state of the former Soviet
Union found to be providing assistance to military and intelligence
facilities in Cuba";7 (5) "Support for democratic and human rights
groups within Cuba";71 (6) "A prohibition on imports of goods
originating in Cuba"; 72 and (7) "A condemnation of the Cuban
downing of the Brothers to the Rescue aircraft. ' 73 Title II is subtitled
"Assistance to a Free and Independent Cuba,"74 and sets forth a
termination of the economic embargo. 75 Title II further provides for
Cuba." Id. Sections 102(0 and (g) are further modifications of the Cuban Democracy Act of
1992. See id. Section 102(h) codifies "[t]he economic embargo of Cuba, as in effect on March
1, 1996, including all restrictions under [31 C.F.R. § 515]." Id.
67. See id. § 103 ("[N]o loan, credit, or other financing may be extended knowingly by a
United States national, a permanent resident alien, or a United States agency to any person for
the purpose of financing transactions involving any confiscated property [claimed by a United
States national].").
68. See id. § 104(a)(1) ("[T]he United States executive director of each international
financial institution [shall] use the voice and vote of the United States to oppose the admission
of Cuba as a member of such institution until the President ... [determines] that a
democratically elected government in Cuba is in power."). This provision is primarily intended
to apply to the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Inter-American
Development Bank. See Lowenfeld, supra note 29, at 423. Section 104(b) states that if "any
international financial institution approves a loan or other assistance to the Cuban government
over the opposition of the United States, then the Secretary of the Treasury shall withhold from
payment to such institution an amount equal to the amount of the loan or other assistance .... "
Id. § 104(b). This provision appears to be contrary to the charters of these institutions. See
Lowenfeld, supra note 29, at 423.
69. See Helms-Burton Act § 105.
70. See id. § 106. This provision was aimed at discouraging support for intelligence
facilities at Lourdes and Cienfuegos. See Jonathan R. Ratchik, Note, Cuban Liberty and the
Democratic Solidarity Act of 1995, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 343, 349 n.49 (1996).
President Clinton initially did not support this provision, believing that assistance to Russia is
necessary for its reform and stability. See id. Clinton later looked past his objections and signed
the bill in response to the February 24, 1996 aircraft downing.
71. See Helms-Burton Act § 109.
72. Seeid.§ 110.
73. Seeid.§ 116.
74. See id. §§ 201-207.
75. See id. § 204. The Act states that "[u]pon submitting a determination to the
appropriate Congressional committees ... that a transition government is in power, the
President, after consultation with the Congress, is authorized to take steps to suspend the
economic embargo of Cuba .... " The steps include suspending the enforcement of section
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various levels of assistance to the Cuban people after a transition
government 76  and a democratically elected government 77  are
established in Cuba.
Title III is subtitled "Protection of Property Rights of United
States Nationals. ' 78 This provision allows American citizens and
companies who have a claim to property confiscated by Cuba79 to
620(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a) (1994), sections 1704,
1705(d), and 1706 of the Cuban Democracy Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6003, 6004(d), 6005, and the
prohibitions on transactions found in the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515
(1997). See Helms-Burton Act § 204(b). Congress, however, retains the right to overturn the
President's suspension of the embargo by passing a joint resolution. See id. § 204(e). On the
date that the President submits a determination to Congress that a democratically elected
government is in power in Cuba, the aforesaid provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
and the Cuban Democracy Act will be repealed automatically. See id. § 204(d).
76. A Cuban government will be recognized as a transition government under the Act if it
"(1) has legalized all political activity; (2) has released all political prisoners .... ; (4) had made
public commitments to organizing free and fair elections for a new government, ...; (7) does
not include Fidel Castro or Raul Castro; and (8) has given adequate assurances that it will allow
the speedy and efficient distribution of assistance to the Cuban people." Helms-Burton Act
§ 205. Assistance provided to Cuba under a transition government shall be "limited to... such
food, medicine, medical supplies and equipment ... as is necessary to meet the basic human
needs of the Cuban people," and assistance in preparing the Cuban military to adjust to an
appropriate role in a democracy. Id. § 202(b)(2)(A).
77. A Cuban government will be recognized as a "democratically elected government" for
the purposes of the Act if, in addition to meeting the requirements for a transition government,
the government
(1) results from free and fair elections ... ; (2) is showing respect for the basic civil
liberties and human rights of the citizens of Cuba; (3) is substantially moving toward a
market-oriented economic system based on the right to own and enjoy property; (4) is
committed to making constitutional changes that would ensure regular free and fair
elections and the full enjoyment of basic civil liberties and human rights by the
citizens of Cuba; ... and (6) has made demonstrable progress in returning to United
States citizens ... property taken by the Cuban Government from such citizens ... or
providing full compensation for such property in accordance with international law
standards and practice.
Id. § 206. Additional financial assistance is also available to a "democratically elected
government." Id. § 202(b)(2)(B).
78. Seeid. §§ 301-306.
79. The expropriated property must be certified by the Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission (FCSC) in order for a party to recover damages. See Ratchik, supra note 70, at
360. The FCSC is an agency of the Justice Department which certifies the claims of U.S.
citizens whose overseas property has been seized by foreign governments without adequate
compensation. See id. The FCSC was created by the President's Reorganization Plan No. 1 of
1954 as a successor to the War Claims Commission and the International Claims Commission.
See id. at 361 n.105. The FCSC has studied 8,816 claims by U.S. citizens and companies
against Cuba stemming from the confiscatons of property carried out by Castro in 1959-60 and
has certified as valid 5911 of such claims. See Arthur Golden, Accounts Receivable, SAN DIEGO
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recover damagess ° in United States courts from anyone who traffics81
such property. Claimants with uncertified claims may bring an action
under Title III only if they were not eligible to file a claim with the
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission.82 In addition, a Title III
action may be brought only if the amount in controversy exceeds$50,000.83 President Clinton has suspended the effective date for the
UNION-TRIB., Sept. 22, 1996, at Il. For a list of all certified claims in excess of $1 million, see
Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Alternative Remedies in a Negotiated Settlement of the U.S.
Nationals' Expropriation Claims Against Cuba, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 659 app. (1996).
Of the certified claims filed with the FCSC, corporate claims constituted all but $200,000
of the original $1.8 billion in claims. See James Rosen, Companies Fret Over Helms-Burton
Law, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, NC), Feb. 24, 1997, at AS. Of the companies with the
twenty-five largest certified claims, Colgate-Palmolive Co. is the only one that has supported
the law publicly. See id. Many of the corporate claimants feel that the law dilutes their holdings
by opening U.S. courts to thousands of former Cuban citizens with claims to expropriated
property. See id.
80. The amount of damages that are recoverable under Title mH is the greatest of (1) the
amount certified to the claimant by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, (2) an amount
determined by a court-appointed special master, if the claim has not been certified, or (3) the
fair market value of the property. See Helms-Burton Act § 302(a)(1). Damages are tripled for
certified claims and for claims by non-certified claimants who have given a thirty-day advance
notice to the defendant. See id. § 302(aX3). Traffickers, however, can avoid treble liability by
ceasing to traffic in confiscated assets within the thirty-day period. See id.
81. A person "traffics" in confiscated property if that person knowingly and intentionally:
(i) sells, transfers, distributes, dispenses, brokers, manages, or otherwise disposes of
confiscated property, or purchases, leases, receives, possesses, obtains control of,
manages, uses, or otherwise acquires or holds an interest in confiscated property, (ii)
engages in a commercial activity using or otherwise benefiting from confiscated
property, or (iii) causes, directs, participates in, or profits from, trafficking ... by
another person, ... without the authorization of any United States national who holds
a claim to the property.
Id. § 4(13)(A).
82. See id. § 302(aX5). Furthermore, these claimants must wait two years to bring an
action under Title III. See id.
83. See id. § 302(b).
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provisions of Title II1.84 Title IV 85 provides for the exclusion from the
United States of any alien who is involved in the confiscation or
trafficking of confiscated property. It further excludes any corporate
officer or controlling shareholder of any entity involved in the
confiscation or trafficking of property of United States nationals.
86
E. Aftermath of the Helms-Burton Act
Since the Act's implementation, the United States has alleged that
several foreign companies have violated the Act.87 Some claimants of
84. The provisions of Title III were to take effect on August 1, 1996. See Helms-Burton
Act § 306(a). The Act gave the President the authority to suspend the effective date if he
determined it was "necessary to the national interests of the United States and will expedite a
transition to democracy in Cuba." Id. After the expiration of the initial six-month period, the
President was authorized to suspend the effective date for additional six-month periods. See id.
§ 306(b). President Clinton took advantage of the suspension provisions on July 16, 1996, in an
attempt to defuse tensions with U.S. trading partners angered by the law. See David E. Sanger,
Clinton Grants, Then Suspends, Right to Sue Foreigners on Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1996,
at Al. Clinton extended the suspension for another six-month period on Jan. 3, 1997. See
Douglas Farah, Cuba Admits U.S. Law Damages Economy, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 28, 1997,
at 2. Clinton has indicated that he will continue to suspend the effective date for Title III in
order to prevent the European Union from pursuing its objections to the Act in the World Trade
Organization. See Jay Branegan, Trading Truce, TIME, Apr. 28, 1997, at 60.
85. Helms-Burton Act § 401.
86. See id. § 401. Additionally, "[t]he Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and the
Attomey General shall exclude from the United States, any alien who the Secretary of State
determines" meets those conditions. Id. §401(a). For purposes of Title IV, the terms
"confiscated" and "traffics" are defined separately within Title IV. The definition of "traffics"
within this section encompasses not only the definition provided in § 4 of the Act, but also one
who "improves (other than routine maintenance), invests in (by contribution of funds or
anything of value, other than for routine maintenance), or begins after the date of the enactment
of this Act to manage, lease, possess, use, or hold an interest in confiscated property." Id.
§ 401(b).
87. One of the first foreign companies to be affected by Title IV was Canada's Sherritt
International Corporation, a Toronto-based mining company. Sherritt is participating in a joint
venture with Cuba to mine nickel on property believed -to have been taken from Freeport
McMoRan, Inc. of New Orleans. See Davis, supra note 51. Sherritt executives were barred
under Title IV from entering the U.S. in July 1996. See Sherritt Defies U.S. Sanctions, FIN.
TIMES, Jan. 28, 1997, at 6. Undeterred by this action, Sherritt formed a new $25 million joint
venture with Cuba in January 1997 for a one-third stake in Energas, a company formed to
convert sulphurous gas from Cuban oil wells into electricity. See id.; see also Zena Olljnyk,
Sherritt's Delaney Defends Cuban Operations, FIN. POST, Feb. 25, 1997, at 13 (reporting that
Sherritt has plans to invest more than $800 million in Cuba in communications, transportation,
sugar, real estate, and tourism). Sherritt reportedly has even loaned $127 million to the Castro
regime. See Richard Siklos, Sherritt Buys "Cuba T-Bill, " FIN'L POST, May 24, 1997, at 1.
The Clinton administration has also barred executives of Grupo Domus, a Mexican
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Cuban property have anticipated the provisions of Title III becoming
effective and have begun warning foreign investors in Cuba of the
possible legal implications of investing in Cuban joint ventures.88 In
response, Cuba has entered into bilateral investment treaties with
several of its trading partners in order to assure foreign companies of
the safety of investing in Cuba.
89
Mexico and Canada have condemned Title IV of the Helms-
Burton Act as a violation of Chapter 16 of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA),90 which allows businessmen to travel
freely throughout the NAFTA countries. 91 Both countries have called
for a meeting of the NAFTA Free Trade Commission in order to
determine whether the Helms-Burton Act violates NAFTA.92 In
addition to the NAFTA challenge, the European Union foreign
ministers are challenging the Act in the World Trade Organization.93
telecommunications company which entered into a joint venture with Cuba in 1994 to operate
Cuba's state-controlled telephone company, from entering the United States. See Davis, supra
note 51. The Administration threatened to take the same action against Cemex, a Mexican
cement manufacturer, which caused Cemex to yield to U.S. pressure and suspend its activities
in Cuba. See Colin McMahon, Mexico Acts to Shield Firms Facing U.S. Penalties Over Cuba,
CHICAGO TRIB., Sept. 12, 1996, at 16. Grupo Domos ended its investment in Cuba in June
1997, contending that it was pushed out by the Cuban government and its former partner in the
joint venture, the Italian telecommunications firm Stet. See Mexican Company Hangs Up on
Cuba, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, June 29, 1997, at A6. As of February 1997, the United States
government was considering barring executives from 24 additional foreign companies. See
Peter Morton, Helms-Burton Ban May Be Expaned, FIN. POST, Feb. 11, 1997, at 7.
88. For example, Freeport McMoRan, the owner of a nickel mine now in the possession
of Sherritt International Corp., has written to Sherritt to establish its claim to the property. See
Davis, supra note 51. Also, in January 1994, a coalition of former Cuban sugar mill owners,
miners, and tobacco growers paid for an advertisement in the Wall Street Journal stating that
"... [a]s soon as the Republic of Cuba reinstates the rule of law, the legitimate owners of these
properties shall exercise their rights to recover them ... GOVERN YOURSELF
ACCORDINGLY." Id.
89. In April 1997, France entered into a bilateral investment treaty with Cuba, joining
fellow EU members Spain, Italy, Britain, and Germany. See Pascal Fletcher, France to Sign
Deal with Cuba, FIN'L TIMES, Apr. 22, 1997, at 8.
90. See Jeffrey P. Bialos, New U.S. Anti-Cuba Law May Harm Trading Partners, LATIN
AM. L. & BUS. REP., Apr. 30, 1996.
91. See id.
92. See Preparing for Retaliation; To Try and Head Off the U.S., LATIN AM. L. & BUS.
REP., Sept. 5, 1996, at 404. The countries also allege that Title III is in violation of Chapter 11
of NAFTA, which deals with free circulation of investment. See id.
93. See Guy de Jonquieres & Lionel Barber, EU Puts US "Bully" in the WTO Dock, FIN.
TIMES, Oct. 3, 1996, at 5. At the beginning of 1997, the EU planned to move forward with its
complaint in the World Trade Organization despite president Clinton's suspensions of Title III
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The United States has informed the World Trade Organization that it
will not yield to any decision on the issue because it feels that the
purpose of the World Trade Organization is not to review foreign
policy or the national security interests of the United States.
94
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED STATES'S CURRENT POLICY TOWARD
CUBA
A. Legality of the Cuban Embargo
The embargo is not authorized 95 under the framework established
by the Trading With the Enemy Act.96 The TWEA allows the
President to impose emergency economic measures only when there
is a threat to national security.97 In addition, under the TWEA
Congress may not impose sanctions unless there is a threat to national98
security interests. Without the economic and military support of the
Soviet Union, Cuba no longer poses a threat to the United States's
of the Act See EU To Pursue WTO Case Against U.S. Helms-Burton Law, REUTER EUR.
CoMMUNITY REP., Jan. 29, 1997. However, in April, the United States and the EU reached an
agreement whereby the EU would suspend its WTO complaint if President Clinton continued to
extend the effective date of Title III. See Thomas Kamm & Carlta Vitzthum, Spanish Leader
Praises Accord on Cuban Trade, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 1997, at A9. this extension would
prevent European companies from being subject to lawsuits under the Act. See id. President
Clinton also agreed to seek an amendment from Congress to soften the provisions of Title IV of
the Act. See id. In response, Congress introduced a foreign aid bill which included provisions
that would remove the President's discretionary power to waive the provisions of Title III. See
Peter Morton, Congress Moving to Harden Line on Helms-Burton, FIN'L POST, June 4, 1997, at
10.
94. See Robert S. Greenberger, U.S. Asserts Foreign Policy Is Involved in its Dispute With
the EU Over Cuba, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 1997, at A2. This stance is seen as a serious threat to
the integrity of the WTO, as it would open the door for other countries to use claims to protect
their industries from foreign competition. See Peter Morton, U.S. Plans to Boycott WTO Panel
in Helms-Burton Row, FIN'L POST, Feb. 21, 1997, at 3. The United States and the EU, however,
are engaged in bilateral negotiations in the hope of obtaining a compromise on the issue of the
Helms-Burton Act. See Greenberger, supra, at A2.
95. See Bourque, supra note 6, at 209.
96. 50 U.S.C. app. § 5 (1994).
97. See id.
98. See id. For example, when President Kennedy established the embargo in 1962, he
declared that Cuba was a threat to national security. See id. In doing so, Kennedy relied on a
declaration made in 1950 by President Harry Truman that the communist goal of world
conquest constituted a "national emergency." Id. at n. 123.
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national security.99 Accordingly, under the TWEA, Cuba is not a
proper object of United States economic sanctions.
The embargo is also a violation of the United States's obligation
under the Organization of American States (OAS) Charter.1° Article
18 of the OAS Charter provides that "[n]o state ... has the right to
intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the
internal or external affairs of any other State."10' By attempting to
control other nations' trade with Cuba, the embargo clearly violates
this obligation. 0 2 Accordingly, by continuing to enforce the embargo,
the United States, as a member of the OAS, is in violation of its
international obligations under the OAS Charter. 03
B. Legality of Other Provisions of the Helms-Burton Act
Several aspects of the Act present problems of international law.
First, Title III of the Act, which allows for the recovery of damages
for expropriated property, is in direct violation of the "nationality of
claims" principle of international law. 1' 4 Under this principle,
"eligibility for compensation requires American nationality at the
time of loss .... ,,m5 Therefore, confiscations by the Cuban
government of property owned by Cuban nationals are not actionable
99. See id. at 210; see also Robert Scheer, Mouse That Roared Has the Last Laugh, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 18, 1997, at B7 (reporting Gen. Barry McCaffrey's statement that "[the whole
Cuban armed forces have come to a grinding halt"); Louis F. Desloge Il, Embargo Against
Cuba is a Failure, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 26, 1995, at B15 (reporting Lt. Gen. John
Sheehan's statement that "Cuba is not a military threat to the U.S. or the region"); Moffett,
supra note 31 ("With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the termination of political support
and financial subsidies from Moscow, Cuba has ceased to be a national security threat.").
100. 33 I.L.M. 981 (1994) [hereinafter OAS Charter].
101. OAS Charter art. 18.
102. See Bourque, supra note 6, at 215.
103. See id. But see Porotsky, supra note 29, at 930 (arguing that the vague language of
Article 18 of the OAS charter is rendered "meaningless" by U.S. economic coercion of Latin
American nations).
104. See Legal and Practical Implications of Title II of the Helms-Burton Lmv: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on W. Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs of the Senate Foreign
Relations Comm., 104th Cong. (July 30, 1996) (statement of Robert L. Muse, Attorney)
[hereinafter Muse]; see also Ratchik, supra note 70, at 360-61 (discussing Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission decisions upholding the nationality of claims doctrine).
105. Muse, supra note 104 (quoting Foreign Claims Settlement Commission Claim No. IT-
10,252, Dec. No. It-62).
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in United States courts. 106 Second, some commentators have argued
that the Act unreasonably exercises the United States's jurisdiction
over extraterritorial activities ' °7 and, thus, it violates the act of state
doctrine. 0
8
There are several aspects of the Act that are problematic due to its
language. First, the Act contains a loophole which, rather than
discouraging foreign investment in Cuba, could lead to more foreign
investment. This is due to a provision of Title III that allows lawsuits
to be settled out of court without requiring United States government
approval. 0 9 Through this provision, foreign companies trafficking in
106. See F. Palicio y Compania, S.A. v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1966),
afj'd, 275 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1967); see also Pons v. Republic of Cuba, 294 F.2d 925, 926
(D.C. Cir. 1961) ("A foreign sovereign's seizure of its own nationals' property in its own
territory cannot be reviewed in our courts.").
107. See Ratchik, supra note 70, at 363-64 ("A state maintains jurisdiction to enact laws
concerning conduct outside its territory which has a substantial effect within its territory, unless
such exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.") (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]).
Factors to be considered in determining whether an exercise of jurisdiction is unreasonable
include:
(a) ... the extent to which the activity takes place within the territory or has a
substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory [of the regulating
state]; ... (d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by
the regulation; ... (f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions
of the international system; [and] (g) the extent to which another state may have an
interest in regulating the activity.
Id. at 363 n. 117 (quoting RESTATEMENT § 403(2)). That the acts in question (the confiscation of
property within Cuba by the Castro regime) took place entirely outside of the United States, that
the Act has not been accepted by the international community, and that the Act conflicts with
Cuba's interest in regulating this activity, supports the assertion that the Act's exercise of
jurisdiction over foreign investors trafficking in American property is unreasonable. See
Ratchik, supra note 70, at 363-64; see also Lowenfeld, supra note 29, at 430-32 (arguing that
the attempt by the authors of the Act to make it comply with the extraterritorial effects doctrine
is flawed in two principal respects).
108. See Lowenfeld, supra note 29, at 365. The act of state doctrine requires United States
federal courts to recognize the validity of acts of foreign governments committed within their
own territory. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416 (1964). However,
the Act prohibits federal courts from applying the act of state doctrine in order to avoid making
a determination of the merits of an action brought pursuant to Title I1. See Helms-Burton Act
§ 302(a)(6). Thus, barring a presidential order instructing federal courts to apply the act of state
doctrine, will not hamper U.S. nationals from pursuing their claims under the Act. See
Lowenfeld, supra note 29, at 366.
109. See Helms-Burton Act § 302(a)(7)(A) ("an action under this section may be brought
and may be settled, and ajudgment rendered in such action may be enforced, without obtaining
any license or other permission from any agency of the United States").
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confiscated United States citizens' assets are able to make a deal with
United States citizens who have claims to those assets. 110 As a result,
an American claimant could receive a share of the profits while the
foreign company continues to traffic in the confiscated property."'
Rather than forfeit their entire Cuban investment, the rational
business choice for companies holding claimed property would be to
negotiate with the claimants and to share the profits."
12
Second, Title IV as it is currently written presents a problem with
its broad definition of "trafficking." This definition fails to clarify
who is considered a "trafficker." For example, anyone who "profits
from" trafficking by another person is also considered to be a
trafficker." 3 This raises the question of how direct must be the nexus
between the confiscated assets and the party in question in order to
find trafficking. "1
4
C. Bilaterl Investment Treaty: An Alternative Approach
Several commentators have proposed that the United States
replace its current embargo against Cuba with a bilateral investment
treaty (BIT) negotiated with the Cuban government.' 11 A BIT creates
a framework in which states may develop mutually beneficial trade
relations." 6 A BIT between the United States and Cuba would further
the United States's goal of reforming Cuba by providing protective
safeguards for United States investors.' '7 At the same time, a BIT
demonstrates to the Cuban people the advantages of a more
110. See Desloge, supra note 99, at A4.
111. Seeid.
112. Seeid
113. an example given by Lowenfeld of the extremely broad reach of this provision is that
if an English company purchases sugar from a Cuban state enterprise and the English company
also does business in the United States, it would be liable to a U.S. national who could show
that some of the English company's purchases consisted of sugar grown on the plantation that
the plaintiffonce owned. See Lowenfeld, supra note 29, at 425-26. Such a broad construction of
the term would allow the United States to apply the Act to nearly any company doing business
in Cuba. See id.
114. Lowenfeld argues that the definition of "trafficking" should take into consideration
the connection between the value of the property on which the claim is based and the value of
the transaction on which the assertion of "trafficking" rests. See id.
115. See Bourque, supra note 6, at 195; Smagula, supra note 7, at 68.
116. See Bourque, supra note 6, at 223.
117. Seeid.at 195.
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democratic capitalist society.' 18
Many BITs for the promotion and protection of foreign
investment have been implemented between Western and developing
countries. 119 The United States signed its first BIT with a former
Soviet bloc nation in 1990 when it entered into an agreement with
Poland.1 20 This BIT addressed many issues that may arise between
the United States and Cuba and, thus, would provide a good model
for a BIT between the two nations.
1 21
A major issue that is often resolved in BITs is restitution for
expropriated property,122 which would likely be a point of contention
in a BIT between the United States and Cuba.123 The United States
has consistently demanded full restitution for expropriated property
when negotiating BITs, 24 which contrasts with the United Nations
standard amount of "appropriate compensation."'125 In order to
overcome this hurdle, a BIT could create a separate tribunal to deal
exclusively with property claims. 126 Claimants would then have the
option of negotiating directly with the Cuban government to settle
their claims or pursuing their claims in this tribunal. 27
V. PROPOSAL
The current state of relations between the United States and Cuba
118. See id.
119. Seeid.at223.
120. See id. at 226. The BIT "established two foreign policy strategies: (1) to encourage the
development of pro-investor international legal norms; and (2) to promote free-market
economic reforms." Id.
121. See id.
122. See id at:225. Borque argued that
[t]o best promote both the protection of nationals as well as compliance with
international law norms, BITs include provisions which specifically address: (I) the
rights of parties with respect to the nationalization and expropriation of property; (2)
the policy of payments and financial transfers pursuant to business relations; and (3)
arbitration clauses which provide for dispute settlement.
Id
123. Seeid. at226.
124. See id. at 225.
125. Id.
126. See Smagula, supra note 7, at 108. A similar tribunal was created to settle property
claims for U.S. property expropriated by Iran. See id.
127. Seeid.
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is not beneficial to either country. While the Cuban people suffer due
to the effects of the United States's embargo, 128 United States
corporations also suffer from their inability to compete with foreign
companies in the Cuban market. Instead of gaining international
support for the embargo, the Helms-Burton Act has only angered
most major United States trading partners. Moreover, the Act has
given the Castro regime greater resolve to persevere in its ideological
battle against the United States.
129
Rather than continuing in its futile attempt to isolate Cuba from
the world community 1 ° and destroy the Castro regime,1 the United
States should terminate the embargo. Prior to the passage of the
Helms-Burton Act, the President could have lifted the embargo
without the assistance of Congress. Through his foreign affairs
authority to revoke the embargo proclamation, the President could
remove most of the trade restrictions.132 However, as the Act codified
the embargo, only Congress can repeal the restrictions.
Thus, Congress should enact comprehensive legislation that
would fundamentally alter relations with Cuba. First, this legislation
should completely repeal the embargo, thereby allowing United
States companies to enter the Cuban market and compete with
128. See David Adams, U.S. Trade Embargo Blames for Cubans' Declining Health, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), June 1I, 1997, at A2 (noting a report by the American Association
for World health stating that the embargo has resulted in .'unnecessary suffering and deaths' by
severely restricting Cuba's access to needed medicines and medical devices"); Malcolm
Wallop, Target Castro, Not Cuba's People, WALL ST. J., Apr. 24, 1997, at A18 (noting the
increase in waterborne diseases in Cuba due to the government's inability to repair U.S.-made
water treatment facilities). In response to these reports, a bipartisan coalition of House members
introduced the Cuban Humanitarian Trade Act on June 18, 1997, supporting the lifting of the
U.S. embargo on food and medicine to Cuba. See Tom Carter, Humane Loophole Sought in
Cuba Embargo, WASH. TIMES, June 19, 1997, at A13.
129. See Tracey Eaton, U.S.-Cuba Relations Worsening, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May
26, 1997, at Al (describing Cuban leaders' determination to maintain socialism in Cuba);
Tracey Eaton, Cubans Blast Proposed U.S. Policies, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 31, 1997,
at A21 (quoting Cuban parliamentary leader Ricardo Alarcon's assertion that the damage
caused to Cuba by the U.S. embargo "will never be enough to bring us to our knees").
130. Cuba currently has diplomatic relations with 161 countries. See Eaton, supra note 129,
at Al.
131. Even President Clinton has recently admitted that "U.S. policy toward Cuba has not
resulted in any appreciable change in the Cuban regime." John Rice, Former U.S. Officials
Criticize Cuba Policy, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 19, 1997, available in WESTLAW, 1997 WL
4862958.
132. See Pagan, supra note 15, at 507-08.
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foreign companies already present there. Cuba, due to its weak
economy that has resulted from the embargo, would likely embrace
United States investment. As a result, the United States would have
the leverage to demand that Castro undertake significant political and
social reforms. As United States trade and tourist dollars pour into
Cuba, Castro's power and influence in Cuba will diminish and the
Cuban people will begin to demand substantial social and political
reforms.1
33
Second, the proposed legislation should repeal Titles I, III, and IV
of the Helms-Burton Act. While the problem of restitution for
expropriated property will remain, the Act does not currently provide
the best resolution to this problem. Rather, the proposed legislation
should authorize the President to negotiate a BIT with the Cuban
government that would allow for a fair settlement of all expropriated
property claims. While the Cuban government may be unable or
unwilling to provide full restitution for claimed property, the claims
can be resolved in other ways. For example, the Cuban government
could offer preferential tax rates or import/export duties to certified
claimants wishing to resume business in Cuba. Additionally, Cuba
could pay restitution to the United States government, which would
then distribute shares to the eligible claimants. Even in the unlikely
scenario that Cuba is unwilling to enter into BIT negotiations with
the United States, the aforementioned provisions of the Act should
still be repealed. Any benefit that these provisions may bring to
United States corporations is outweighed by the tensions these
provisions have created among United States trading partners.
Third, Title II of the Act should be modified so as to allow for
United States assistance to Cuba even if Castro remains in power,
provided that Castro is willing to guarantee the recognition of
universal standards of human rights with Cuba. Denying aid to Cuba
merely because Castro remains in power is meaningless if he is
willing to allow for some political and economic reforms. Castro has
already demonstrated his willingness to institute reforms when
necessary. Refusing to provide any aid to Cuba will merely support
Castro with political capital in his struggle against the United States
133. Similarly, the people of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe demanded social and
political reform afterperestroika was introduced.
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and prolong the suffering of the Cuban people.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Helms-Burton Act was passed with overwhelming bipartisan
support in the aftermath of the death of four Cuban-Americans whose
planes were shot down by Cuban fighter planes.134 Despite such
congressional support, the Act is one of the most controversial laws
to be passed in the United States in recent years. It has angered
United States trading partners and has not been very effective in
achieving its goal of discouraging foreign investment in Cuba.
Accordingly, the time is ripe for the United States to repeal the
problematic provisions of the Helms-Burton Act and start treating
Cuba in the same manner as it has recently dealt with other
recalcitrant regimes: by using the leverage of economic power to
persuade leaders that reform is in their best interests. 135 Only in this
manner can there be changes that will benefit all parties involved in
the ongoing war of ideologies and finances between the United States
and Cuba.
Jeffrey Dunning*
134. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
135. An example would be U.S. relations with China. See Wallop, supra note 128
(suggesting that the U.S. hardline policy toward Cuba is inconsistent with that taken toward
China, North Korea, and Iraq, all of which are greater threats to U.S. security but are not subject
to such severe sanctions).
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